

Thule accident


Sven Nielsen

On January 21, 1968, a B-52 bomber (HOB0 28) carrying four nuclear weapons crashed on the sea ice off the shore of Thule, Greenland. Both the aircraft and the weapons disintegrated on impact. There was no nuclear explosion since the design of the weapons precluded any nuclear reaction. Nevertheless, limited contamination resulting from the dispersed radioactive material from the weapons had to be controlled and removed, as did the aircraft debris.




HOBO 28 Accident details



- Following take-off, the flight proceeded uneventfully. The first aerial refueling, accomplished approximately 4 hours into the mission, was routine. One hour later the aircraft commander instructed the copilot to begin crew rest. At this moment started a series of events that led to the destruction of HOBO 28. The cabin temperature became too cool for comfort at the flight-planned altitude. In accordance with approved procedures, the copilot set the temperature control to maximum heat. This action provided a source of very hot air for cabin temperature control. After making the initial setting, the copilot began decreasing the control setting as crew members reported they were getting too hot. Then, a few miles south of Thule Air Base, one crew member reported the odor of burning rubber. With fumes growing stronger in the cabin, the aircraft commander instructed the crew to go on oxygen and locate the source of danger.
- The navigator searched the crew compartment once without finding where the smoke and fumes were coming from. Ordered to make a second search of the same area, he moved a metal box, and located the fire. Hurriedly he alerted the crew and started using a fire extinguisher on the flames. The pilot notified the ground station of a fire in the cabin and requested authority for an immediate descent and for emergency landing at Thule Air Base. Two minutes later he began the descent. Downstairs, the navigator was having little success in containing the fire even though he had now used both available fire extinguishers. Shortly after descent began, all aircraft electrical power was lost, and the bailout order was given and executed. The aircraft continued on down, struck the ice in a steep left bank and disintegrated from impact, explosion, and fire.
- Seven persons were aboard the aircraft. Six survived.



USAF NUCLEAR SAFETY








Aerial photograph of the crash site.



Capt William K. McRaney scanning the ice core.



FIDLER



Loading aircraft parts into engine containers.



Mariners scooping contaminated snow from the sea ice.

Sealing a tank containing aircraft debris.



An easier reaction to this kind of emergency. There is some critical ground (good pre-planning, flexibility, adequate support, and priorities in handling requirements). There is always a conflict of interest between immediate action and implementation and appropriate documentation. The Crested Ice Project exemplified the value of a carefully prepared program and adequate documentation. It is to be noted that progress is still in areas which required reconsideration. In the long run, comprehensive documentation is the key to the saving of time and money.



Crate lowering a crane with 28,000-gallon tank prepositioned to loading it with debris-laden snow and ice.

Hopefully, there will be no more Crested Ice or comparable problems. If, however, the project demonstrated anything, it was the almost faultless adaptability of well-trained, disciplined and motivated people. Their intelligence, ingenuity, and determination in solving a problem without precedent—in the most inhospitable of environments—was a source of great pride to me. To men like these, nothing is impossible. Their saga will be a continuing inspiration to all of us.

JAN/FEB/MAR 1970






Figure 5. Microphotograph showing alpha tracks from plutonium particles in a sample from the crushed ice.





Figure 3. Map of the Bylot Sound area showing plutonium contamination levels. The point of impact is marked with a cross.

Cleaning up




Personnel monitoring at decontamination station.

Nasal swabs were included in the personnel monitoring routine.



Col C. S. Dresser, (right), base commander at Thule AB, and Commander Jorgen Malgard, Danish liaison Officer, make a clean sweep of Project Crested Ice.




Project Crested Ice



- Plane wreckage and weapons components shipped to US
- Contaminated ice/snow stored in 25000 Gallon tanks at Tank Farm before sending to US
- Radioecological follow-up



B-52 - US Strategic Air Force



Previous Thule investigations

- Marine expeditions: 1968, 1970, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1991, 1997, 2003
- Terrestrial sampling (Including lakes):
 - 1968 (Crested Ice). Pu on snow at Narssarssuk, Saunders Island and Wolstenholme identified.
 - 1968 (WC Hanson). Investigations around Kap Atholl. Weapons Pu identified.
 - 1997 (Eriksson & Holm). Soil & lake sediments north & east of TAB. No signs of weapons Pu.
 - 2003 (Thule-2003 expedition). Soil sampling at Narssarssuk
 - 2006 Sampling at Nassarssuk and south of Green Valley.

US EML air sampling at Thule Air Base





Fig. 5. EML measurements of the air concentration of $^{239,240}\text{Pu}$ at the Thule air base (EML, 1999).




Thule-97: Erkki Ilus, STUK, Mats Eriksson, LU & Risø



Gemini sediment sampler

Biota fishing equipment: Crabnets (below) and Sigsbee trawl (right)





$^{240}\text{Pu} / ^{239}\text{Pu}$ atom ratios, Thule (1968), Palomares (1966) and Urals


Sampling campaign 14-27 August 2003

- Sediment mapping
- Sampling of
 - Sediment, particles
 - Seawater
 - Seaweed
 - Other biota
 - Soil




Research Vessel Adolf Jensen, 165 BRT (1967)

Seabed characteristics from side-scan sonar



Thule 25
objekter på
bunden

Rectangular object of ca. 5x5
m found at about 180 m depth




Thule 21
pløjemærker


100m

Iceberg scour marks on seabed at 100-150 m

Sampling locations for sediment and soil in 2003




Total $^{239,240}\text{Pu}$ in sediments



Results from 2003 survey

- Pu inventory in sediments estimated with systematic account of hot particles at 3 TBq (about 1 kg), which is higher than earlier estimates
- Pu in seawater, sediments and biota illustrate remobilisation from the seabed and transport to surface waters and further away
- Insignificant risk of exceeding dose limit from marine exposure pathways
- Small potential risk on land from inhaling resuspended radioactive particles

Gamma measurements 2006



Vacuuming for hot particles at Narssarsuk, 2007



Passive sampling of aerosols using sticky surfaces





Active air sampling



Soil sampling




Am-241 in soil

Portable gamma spectrometer
used for field measurement of
 ^{241}Am at Narssarsuk with
detector at 1 m above ground



Am-241 in soil




Am-241 in soil determined from laboratory analyses of soil samples and field measurements.

Pu/Am concentrations on land

Estimates based on geostatistical analysis of data from lab analyses of soil samples and field measurements.

Spatial prediction of the $\log_{10}(\text{Am})$ concentrations in the Narsaarsuk area overlaid with height curves. Black dots indicate measurement locations.

Total Pu inventory on land estimated at 100 g with 95% confidence interval from 50 g to 200 g



Dose assessment at Thule, 2011

- External dose – negligible contribution from Pu/Am contamination compared to natural background
- Inhalation – extremely low concentrations of Pu in air and doses correspondingly low
- Ingestion of meat from musk oxen – no analytical data available on Pu/Am in meat from musk oxen, but experience from UK/USA on transfer to cattle and sheep indicates that the dose will be insignificant
- Wound contamination – conservative estimates of a wound contamination of 0.1 g contaminated soil or a hot particle cause doses well below 1 mSv/y
- Total doses to individuals in the Thule area are estimated to be smaller than 1 mSv/y and have no significance to health



The End