


Update on elements and methodologies used in the Nordic countries in decision support.

Nordic perspectives of Fukushima: Where are we now and where do we go?

Joint NKS-R and NKS-B Seminar, Stockholm, 12-13 January 2016


Steen Hoe Nuclear Division, DEMA







- Decision Support System developed since 1993
- Maintained by the ARGOS Consortium (operational Emergency Organisation and PDC-ARGOS) and used worldwide)
- Models from research organisation supported by EU Research programs (FP5,6 and 7) and the ARGOS Countries






Danish implementation

- One installation for R,N and C
- Identical metrological data for R, N and C with worldwide meteorological data access.
- Identical GIS data buildings (Denmark) and populations
- Identical meso-scale dispersion model (RIMPUFF) for R,N and C – Special long range models for N (R)
- Identical Urban dispersion (URD) for R and C
- Identical Food- and Urban dose model for R and N
- Special Chemical source- and consequence model
- Special monitoring data implementation for R and N

Release, Pre-release and Planning phase


- Automated Dispersion Calculation, time of arrival for closest NPP calculated 4 times daily.
- Automated Dispersion Calculation for urban Areas for R and C





Release, Pre-release and Planning phase N


 DERMA: Global Long Range model with horizontal resolution from 3km to 30 km – the 3km model also for R.





Release (R,N), Pre-release phase (N) - Source


- RIMPUFF: Dispersion Calculation, with Precipitation from RADAR if possible in
 - Source Term for Reactors from ARGOS DB, multiple sources possible.
 - Source Terms for N multiple point sources.
- URD model also includes "Dirty Bomb" modelling in form of predefined initial shapes (puff column) and initial deposition
- URD will also create a potential damage zone before the actual run





Urban Dispersion


1 min after explosion





Uncertainty in numerical weather prediction (NWP)


- Presentation of statistical data
- 25 dispersion calculations resulting in a statistical envelope.
- Not physical Correct
- NKS(.org) financed project
- Fukushima test case.





Monitoring after plume for model use

- **Nuclide specific deposition** input from AGS and CGS system in raw 4242 format,
- Dose rate can be converted with a Nuclide Vector






Dose and Countermeasure modelling

- Danish Implementation
 - Urban dose modelling with ERMIN on 100m grid
 - Food Dose Modelling with AgriCP on 5 km Grid



Food Dose and Countermeasure Modelling


 First version of the implementation was based on municipalities but they became to large. In 2015 the basis was changed to 5 km grid (part of the Danish National Grid).





Food Dose Modelling

ARGOS will list areas where the max food levels is exceeded







Urban Dose and Countermeasure modelling


- ERMIN (The European Model for Inhabited Areas)
- Input from Atmospheric dispersion or monitoring
- Dose calculation, counter measures
- Waste, Worker dose









ERMIN model description








Dose and Countermeasure modelling in URBAN areas – ERMIN display





Countermeasure strategy for URBAN or Food



National Exercise "Krisøv" November 2016

- "Krisøv" exercise every second year.
- 2013 Cyber attach
- 2015 Nuclear accident
- Command post not a "real" Nuclear exercise for testing the national crisis plan.
- The Nuclear accident plan is a sub-plan of the main plan, **first test**



National Danish Exercise (Krisøv)November 2016

Ministerier

Statsministeriet Forsvarsministeriet Justitsministeriet Udenrigsministeriet Erhvervs- og Vækstministeriet Energi-, Forsynings- og Klimaministeriet Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet Sundheds- og Ældreministeriet

Styrelser

Rigspolitiet Beredskabsstyrelsen Politiets Efterretningstjeneste Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste Center for Cybersikkerhed Sundhedsstyrelsen Værnsfælles Forsvarskommando Energistyrelsen Fødevarestyrelsen Søfartsstyrelsen Geodatastvrelsen Miljøstyrelsen NaturErhvervsstvrelsen Naturstyrelsen Trafikstyrelsen Vejdirektoratet Banedanmark Østjyllands Politi Region Midtjylland DMI

Øvrige aktører DR Ritzau Den britiske ambassade Den norske ambassade Den svenske ambassade Den australske ambassade






National Exercise "Krisøv", the scenario



- Collision between the nuclear propelled Russian 'Sevmorput' and a Danish ship in passing Denmark.
- 'Sevmorput' was severely damaged and put on ground 10 km offshore.
- Damaged reactors with a late LOCA.
- Possible large release of radioactivity from 'Sevmorput'




National Exercise "Krisøv" the scenario 2



National Exercise "Krisøv" the source term

- The source terms based on VVER scaled to fit the thermal effect.
 - Low: 10 h- 30 %Xe..., 0,2% I, 0,1% Cs.....
 - Medium:3h 80% Xe , 8% I, 4% Cs
 - High:1.5 h -80% Xe, 20% I, 20% Cs.....








National Exercise "Krisøv" results

- Low deposition no rain
- Food chain monitor food the next year.
- Potential acute radiation syndrome up to 500m from the ship






Grena Airport

Grena

Cs-137 deposition


The same results, but different target groups







2 Hours rain added with release 2 h later

- High deposition MBq range
- Intervention levels exceeded in the city Grenå



























olio: 30 Days			-						
from 0 Sv to 1 Sv									
s after 30 days									
s anter 50 days									
d Cells w/Dose, Sa	ved dose and We	orker dose [Sv]	,						
ommunity 🔺	Grid	Expected	Collective	Saved: 1.Urban1	Saved: 2.Urban2	Worker: 1.Urban1	Worker: 2.Urban2	Waste [t]: 1.Urban1	Waste [t]: 2.U 🔺
m 6225 600	26	5.399E-02	7.019E-01	4.653E-02	2.745E-02	2.505E-03	1,179E-04	164.40	waste [tj. 2.0 H
cm_6225_600 cm_6225_600	20	5.399E-02 5.399E-02	9.719E-01	4.653E-02 4.653E-02	2.745E-02 2.745E-02	2.505E-03	1.632E-04	164.40	-
m_6225_600	28	9.722E-02	2.333E+00	8.378E-02	4.942E-02	4.534E-03	3.921E-04	164.40	1
cm_6225_600	29	1.404E-01	1.826E+00	1.210E-01	7,138E-02	6.563E-03	3.069E-04	164.40	1
cm 6225 600	31	1.478E-01	2.809E+00	1.274E-01	7.523E-02	7.045E-03	4.925E-04	164.40	-
m_6225_600	50	5.399E-02	1.782E+00	4.653E-02	2.745E-02	2.505E-03	2,992E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	51	5.399E-02	7.559E-01	4.653E-02	2.745E-02	2.505E-03	1.269E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	52	9.722E-02	1.167E+00	8.378E-02	4.942E-02	4.534E-03	2.049E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	53	1.404E-01	3.230E+00	1.210E-01	7.138E-02	6.563E-03	5.429E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	56	1.478E-01	3.253E+00	1.274E-01	7.523E-02	7.045E-03	5.702E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	74	5.399E-02	1.512E+00	4.653E-02	2.745E-02	2.505E-03	2.539E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	75	5.399E-02	9.179E-01	4.653E-02	2.745E-02	2.505E-03	1.541E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	76	9.722E-02	2.625E+00	8.378E-02	4.942E-02	4.534E-03	4.411E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	77	1.404E-01	3.652E+00	1.210E-01	7.138E-02	6.563E-03	6.137E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	98	5.399E-02	1.080E+00	4.653E-02	2.745E-02	2.505E-03	1.813E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	99	5.399E-02	1.188E+00	4.653E-02	2.745E-02	2.505E-03	1.995E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	100	9.722E-02	6.805E-01	8.378E-02	4.942E-02	4.534E-03	2.049E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	101	1.404E-01	1.545E+00	1.210E-01	7.138E-02	6.563E-03	2.965E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	102	1.404E-01	3.511E+00	1.210E-01	7.138E-02	6.563E-03	5.901E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	122	5.399E-02	9.719E-01	4.653E-02	2.745E-02	2.505E-03	1.632E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	123	5.399E-02	9.179E-01	4.653E-02	2.745E-02	2.505E-03	1.541E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	124	9.722E-02	1.361E+00	8.378E-02	4.942E-02	4.534E-03	2.287E-04	164.40	1
m_6225_600	125	1.404E-01	3.090E+00	1.210E-01	7.138E-02	6.563E-03	5.193E-04	164.40	1 🗸
									>







Lessens identified – personal view

- More training of key player in the crises committee/ problems with formats of results.
- Experts was separated under the exercise, creating communication problems.
- The crisis committee do not accept uncertainty they want yes or no?
- The crisis committee will take the most conservative approach when implementing countermeasures after a radioactive contamination?
- We have the tools, but can we explain why we should use them?



The near future for the Nordic DSS

- Updated models with support for the new BSS's
 - ERMIN 2 and AgriCP is updated to include the new concepts from ICRP103/109.
 - ARGOS is a important tools for the implementation of the new BSS.
- Source Terms for NPP will come later in the new EUresearch - FASTNET project.

